Thus it is somewhat surprising to find Kaupa describing the “price stability rule” of the European Central Bank as a pluralist tool (p.289). After all, the emphasis on price stability as the primary objective of the central bank is a fundamentally ordoliberal principle that has been a part of the German Bundesbank since the post-Second World War era. The fact that the ECB was modelled after the Bundesbank has been widely documented and acknowledged in the literature. The fact that the nominal inflation target (2 per cent) was not agreed in the Treaties or that the ECB has pursued a variety of strategies in order to tackle deflation in the crisis years is not yet an indication of competing socio-economic paradigms. And, while Kaupa is right in pointing out that the supervisory mechanisms of the Stability and Growth Pact leave considerable room for discretion (p.300), we should keep in mind that most of the northern euro area countries have consistently ruled out all fiscal instruments that would genuinely be about the creation of demand (e.g. the euro area budget).

To put it differently, it still remains an open question why, despite the evident plurality characteristic of the European economic constitution, the austerity-driven approach of Germany and other northern countries has dominated the crisis management. If the Treaties would allow for greater flexibility (p.336), why has this not been pursued to promote different socio-economic goals? Is this still due to the fact that the dominant responses to the euro crisis followed the standard neo-classical theories such as the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis, or was the primary approach of the euro elite that of ordoliberal moralism that put the blame on weak countries such as Greece?

Perhaps one of the inferences of the book is that the “neoliberal thought and practice” (p.1) characteristic of the post-war era is in fact an ambiguous concept that allows for several political interpretations and institutional strategies. As Kaupa demonstrates, especially the ordoliberal interpretation of neoliberalism was in many ways less dogmatic than the kind of moralistic liberalism or libertarianism pursued by the Austrian School. It was exactly this kind of adaptability to the new institutional strategies and socio-political goals that made ordoliberalism so influential in post-war Germany and the early EEC. Despite the fact that the ECB, in its pursuit to tackle deflation in the crisis years, may have not followed the strict policies advocated by hardline ordoliberals such as Hans-Werner Sinn, it may be concluded that the unconventional measures have still contributed to the larger goal of keeping the euro area afloat.

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A significant number of international environmental treaties and domestic legislations encapsulate an array of principles, ranging from the integration of environmental concerns into all policy areas, to sustainable development. It comes thus as no surprise that environmental principles such as polluter-pays, prevention and precaution have a high profile in environmental law. However, in spite of their success, these principles are still elusive.

This book aims, on the one hand, to demonstrate how courts apply environmental principles with the aim of developing legal reasoning, and, on the other, to show how these principles are “highly charged concepts for scholars in thinking about the nature of environmental law as a discipline”. As a matter of course, the two issues are entangled, given that case law reckons upon doctrinal opinions. In particular, environmental scholars have played, for at least 40 years, a pivotal role in the codification of that legal discipline and the proclamation of a flurry of principles and new concepts.
The author, who is a senior lecturer at Kings College London, has written this book with the purpose of deepening the legal understanding of the environmental landmark principles by comparing the scope of the EU principles with those of New South Wales (NSW).

The author rightly stresses that environmental principles do not have a pre-determined meaning. Hence, these principles point in more than one direction. They are rather flexible as they have to be adjusted to an array of legal issues ranging from administrative law to civil liability. Given the range of applications of these principles, environmental law is stopping short of being a unified legal discipline. As a matter of course, that discipline cannot be unified "through the simple legal construction of foundational principles" (p.264). That point of view can be criticised, since in a several Member States (Belgium, France, etc.) a number of substantive and procedural principles are encapsulated in the core provisions of the domestic environmental framework with a view of enhancing a consistent approach to environmental regulation. In other words, owing to the proclamation of transversal objectives and key principles, national law-makers aim at unifying environmental law.

At the outset, the comparison between principles belonging to EU law—which is an international legal order in its own right—and the ones developed by NSW, which is a sub-entity of the Australian federal system, was not obvious. For instance, in contrast to the EU principles enshrined in art.191 TFEU, the NSW environmental principles are encapsulated in state legislation. Given that environmental policy is a shared competence, the treaty environmental principles are mostly interpreted and enforced by the Member States’ courts. By the same token, the CJEU and the General Court have been playing a key role in honing the scope of principles such as the polluter-pays principle and the precautionary principles, whereas in NSW, a specialised adjudicatory body—the NSW Land and Environment Court—has been reviewing the consistency of NSW regulation with similar principles. In addition, NSW belongs to the common law tradition, whereas the EU has created a sui generis legal order blending different legal traditions. It comes thus as no surprise that the role of principles is determined by the legal culture of the jurisdictions in which they are employed (p.261). The author succeeds to overcome most of these hurdles.

Regarding the CJEU, the author is “mapping” the role of the art.191 TFEU principles in three different categories. First, she identifies the “policy cases” where the principles “do not act as independent standards”, given the reluctance of courts to apply them. Secondly, she distinguishes the “interpretative cases” where principles are applied by the courts with the aim of determining the scope of the rule at stake. The third category encompasses the principles applied in order to “inform legal tests”.

With respect to the second function, which is indeed one of the core functions of these principles, it must be noted that the proclamation of environmental principles in Treaty law does not amount to a revolution. The narrow review of legal and administrative acts, such as the manifest error of appraisal doctrine, by both the CJEU and domestic courts, critically determines the scope of the environmental principles. For instance, the precautionary principle hones but does not replace the existing review tests of EU regulations (see, for example, Afton Chemical Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (C-343/09) EU:C:2010:419; [2011] 1 C.M.L.R. 1). By the same token, the polluter-pays principle is applied by the CJEU with a general principle of EU law, the proportionality principle (see, for instance, Futura Immobiliare Srl Hotel Futura v Comune di Casoria (C-254/08) EU:C:2009:479; [2009] 3 C.M.L.R. 45 at [52]).

Along the same lines, the author correctly stresses the extent to which the principle of precaution has become intertwined with the principle of proportionality. However, this categorisation misses the fact that some principles can be applied as an autonomous review standard. The precautionary principle acts as an autonomous standard against which risk regulation can be reviewed (see France v Commission (T-257/07) EU:T:2011:444). In particular, in the area of food safety, the violation of the precautionary principle is regularly invoked by claimants. Thus, in our view, precaution must be analysed as a sub-category of the general principle of “bonne administration”.

All in all, the author demonstrates that, while these principles mirror a new kind of open-textured transnational rules, their meaning and application should be understood in the specific context of their implementation in complex procedural legal schemes. Consequently, in order to understand the meaning of these principles, scholars must venture into the esoteric universe of environmental law.

The author supports the view that the CJEU endorses a doctrinal discourse. This can be arguable from a Romano-Germanic perspective, which draws a sharp distinction between the case law and the doctrine.

Lastly, the author limits her analysis of the doctrinal debate on the EU environmental principles to the English literature. In so doing, she omits the rich doctrinal debate in Dutch, German, French and Italian, official languages of Member States where environmental principles have been widely applied by domestic courts. Plurilateralism and plurilingualism of the EU legal order, although challenging, is at the same time an opportunity for a more encompassing legal analysis.

That being said, this book adds value to the existing literature and is likely to contribute to the ongoing debate on the need to proclaim a set of environmental principles at worldwide level. The recent French initiative to prepare, introduce, and eventually adopt the “Global Pact for the Environment”, being chaired by Laurent Fabius, is indeed gaining momentum.

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As promised by its subtitle, the reviewed book offers a comprehensive overview of the main aspects of legislation. It addresses both organisational and procedural issues but also includes aspects of the substance of legislation. This ranges from the management of legislative processes to issues of maintenance of rules and publication, but the book also includes chapters on EU legislation, the participation of stakeholders in legislative procedures, and legislative training. However, most of the 15 chapters zoom in on the procedural aspects of legislating. Thus the picture that emerges is that of legislation and legislative procedures becoming increasingly structured. From the introductory chapter it appears that such a more structured approach to legislation should indeed be promoted to ensure objectives such as the effectiveness, coherence and precision of legislation (p.16). This normative view is largely absent in the subsequent chapters, however, as these examine legislative developments rather from comparative perspectives.

The first chapter more generally sets the scene for the rest of the book and places its approach in the context of legisprudence, the study of legislation and its guiding principles. The approach offered by this book distinguishes itself from other work in this area (see for instance the book edited by Wintgens in 2002 under the title Legisprudence) first and foremost by its practical approach. This is reflected in the list of authors, which combines academics and legislative professionals. Rather than a concluding chapter, the last contribution of the volume (Ch.15) offers a self-standing analysis of general trends in legislation in Europe, in particular in the EU. It views how EU legislative policies have evolved from being oriented on legislative quality standards (such as clarity and simplicity) to the post-Lisbon Smart Regulation policy agenda that views regulation as a policy cycle that involves EU institutions, Member States and also stakeholders. The author of this chapter criticises these policies for them not being used to (re-)balance business’ and citizens’ interests (p.283). This is a key argument in this contribution, especially since legislative policies are at high risk of becoming bogged down in technocratic processes. As such, this